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For a long time, migration has been subject to intensive economic research. Nevertheless, 
empirical evidence regarding the determinants of migration still appears to be incomplete. In 
this paper, we analyze the effects of socio-economic and institutional determinants, especially 
labor-market institutions, on migrants' choices. Based on a large data set constructed from 
micro-data for France, Germany, the UK and the US, we study their decisions to migrate to 
one of the four countries using a Multinomial Choice framework. Our estimates confirm a 
number of conventional results such as positive effects of wages and immigrant networks and 
negative effects of unemployment rates. In addition, we find that employment protection, 
union coverage and unemployment benefits have positive effects on migration. Also good 
education and health systems tend to attract migrants, while generous pension systems may 
deter them. Based on separate estimations for high- and low-skilled migrants, there is 
evidence that the effects of labor-market institutions differ across skill groups. 
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December 2008 1 Introduction
Moving to another country often implies fundamental changes for the life of migrants.
They have to build up a new social network and get accustomed to a new institutional
framework. Usually, migration is not the result of a spontaneous decision, but the out-
come of a long decision process. Therefore, the institutions of possible destination coun-
tries should at least play some role in this process. For instance, if public regulation
impedes labor-market entry for \outsiders", migrant workers should ceteris paribus prefer
destination countries with more exible labor markets. Similarly, older persons should
prefer countries that give them access to a better health-care system, and parents should
prefer countries that oer their children better education. The aim of our paper is to
analyze whether these and other institutions play a role for the migration decision and to
quantify their eects.
How migrants choose their destination country is an interesting research question per
se. In addition, the answer to this question has important implications for migration
policy. On the one hand, it can help to estimate migration potentials for the case of
unrestricted mobility which, in turn, may have a strong inuence on the nal decision
about immigration policy if a country is considering some modications. On the other
hand, it can have an inuence on the assessment of migration regulations already in
place. A prominent example for this is the large inow of Polish people to the UK
after the EU enlargement in 2004. It is argued that a large part of these people would
have come to Germany, if Germany had also opened its labor market immediately (Baas
and Br ucker 2007). However, in the relevant years unemployment in the UK was much
lower than in Germany. Thus, one could also argue that these people would have gone
to the UK anyway because of their better labor-market prospects there. Last but not
least, knowledge about the determinants of migration decisions can help policy makers
to design eective programs to attract specic groups of foreigners (such as the British
\Highly Skilled Migrant Programme" the H1B visa in the US, or the German \Green
Card" for IT specialists).
Over the last few years, a series of papers have emerged that analyze the determi-
1nants of migrants' location choices (e.g., Pedersen et al. 2008; Mayda 2007; Docquier
et al. 2007). These papers are based on international macro-data panels.1 Besides un-
employment rates and GDP per capita, they nd that distance plays an important role
for migration decisions. In addition, a common language and colonial ties obviously have
a positive eect on the choice of a particular destination country. However, the use of
aggregate data carries some problems, as the determinants of migration most likely dif-
fer between population groups (e.g., labor-market access may vary by qualications and
experience; the quality of the destination country's education system is more important
for young parents than for childless retires; etc.).2 Therefore, we follow another route and
build our analysis on micro-data.
Unfortunately, no large international micro-data base exists that could be used for our
purposes.3 We therefore construct our own data set, merging micro-data from four of the
most important immigration countries, namely France, Germany, the UK and the US.4
Because of the limited number of countries covered, we can only analyze migrants' choices
conditional on that they are willing to migrate at all and that they end up living in one
of these four destination countries.5 We combine these micro-data with data regarding a
number of institutions that potentially have an impact on the location decision. Using a
Multinomial Choice framework, we then estimate the eects of these institutions on the
choice of a particular destination among our four countries. From a technical perspective,
Constant and D'Agosto (2008) is the paper on international migration that is probably
closest to ours. Based on a data set covering Italian scientists living abroad, they analyze
1See Lundberg (1993) for an earlier study based on cross-section data.
2Docquier et al. (2007) dierentiate between high-skilled and low-skilled migrants, whereas the other
researchers look at total migration between two countries.
3The European Labour Force Survey would be such a data base but, in its publicly accessible form,
it contains no information on the origin of migrants.
4Defoort (2007) states that, together with Canada and Australia, these countries attract 77% of all
migrants to the OECD world.
5For an analysis of the unconditional migration decision, one would also have to observe popula-
tions and institutions in the source countries, and one should probably be able to add more destination
countries.
2the determinants of their choice of a destination country. In contrast to our approach,
however, they only use individual characteristics and no general features of the destination
countries as explanatory variables. There is a number of papers using a similar approach
to determine the regional distribution of immigrants within their destination countries
( Aslund 2005; Bartel 1989; Jaeger 2000; and Bauer et al. 2005; 2007). Since political and
economic institutions do not vary very much across regions of one country, whereas they
dier substantially across countries, the results are only partially comparable with ours.
To date, the impact of institutions on migration decisions has hardly been studied in a
systematic way.6 Thus, our results oer interesting and important new insights regarding
the determinants of migration decisions. Our more conventional ndings are that wages
and migrant networks have a positive eect on the probability to migrate to a particu-
lar country, while the unemployment rate has a negative eect. The income tax wedge
negatively aects migration, and the same applies to generous pension benets, while
good education systems and good health-care systems appear to have a positive impact.
In addition, we nd that the labor-market institutions which we consider { employment
protection, union coverage and unemployment benets { all have positive eects on the
migration decision. Running separate estimations for qualied and low-skilled migrants,
we nd for most institutions the same eects. However, union coverage and unemploy-
ment benets now negatively aect the migration choice for qualied migrants, while
the positive eects are again there for low-skilled migrants. Also, the positive eect of
employment protection remains for both groups.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain how our data
set is constructed. In section 3, we present a number of descriptive results regarding
immigration to the four countries of our analysis. Section 4 deals with determinants of
migration and, in particular, with institutions that may have an inuence on migration
decisions. In section 5, we discuss our estimation strategy, and in section 6, we present
6Borjas (1999) investigated the role of welfare benet entitlements for migration within the US, which
led to his \welfare magnet" hypothesis. More recently, Docquier et al. (2007) found a positive eect of
social expenditure and health expenditure. We are not aware of any studies investigating labor-market
institutions as potential determinants of migrants' location choices.
3our results based on the full sample and on separate estimations for qualied and low-skilled
migrants. Section 7 concludes.
2 The data set
Our data set combines micro-data from large ocial surveys of the British, French, Ger-
man and US population. The source of our French data is the Enqu^ ete Emploi en Continu
2005, a representative survey of about 0.5% of the French population. The German data
are taken from the Mikrozensus 2005, a representative 1% survey (0.7% in the Scientic
Use File we are using). The British data are from the (British) Labour Force Survey for
the rst quarter of 2005, a survey of about 0.2% of the population in the UK. For the
US, we use the American Community Survey 2005, a representative 1% survey of the US
population. In order to analyze the motivation of migrants, ow data would actually be
preferable to stock data. However, existing ow data generally contain much less infor-
mation and are less precise than stock data. Therefore, we rely on data of the latter type,
implying that we actually do not analyze decisions to migrate to another country, but
decisions to migrate to another country and stay there until the sampling period.
An important preliminary step is to nd a proper denition of migrants. Immigrants
could be dened as persons holding one or more foreign nationalities. Yet, this approach
is problematic as naturalization policies of the four countries dier substantially. For
instance, the German naturalization policy is much more restrictive than the American
one. Hence, looking at individuals with foreign nationalities could lead to biased results.
Dening immigrants by their country of birth circumvents this problems. However, since
foreign-born children whose parents are both natives are then classied as immigrants,
this denition can also lead to problems, e.g., if a non-marginal part of the foreign-born
population are children of armed forces positioned abroad. Therefore, we choose the
following approach: we dene immigrants as foreign-born people, but re-classify persons
with two native parents as natives.7 The eect of this re-classication on the overall
7For the UK, respectively, we re-classify persons who state to be \ethnically British".
4number of immigrants is small, but their composition changes notably (see Geis et al.
2008 for more details).
In the case of Germany, we have to deal with two specic issues. First, in the German
data the country of birth of immigrants is not recorded. We therefore use the nationality,
respectively the nationality before naturalization, as a proxy for the country of birth. The
second issue is related to the \(Sp at-)Aussiedler" legislation. According to this legislation,
persons with German ancestors (who sometimes emigrated centuries ago, mainly to coun-
tries in Eastern Europe) can acquire the German nationality immediately upon arrival
in Germany. After the fall of the \Iron Curtain", a large number of \Sp at-Aussiedler"
came to Germany (Koller 1997). Yet, in spite of their quantitative importance, ocial
statistics in Germany hardly collect any data on this group. In our data set, we are able
to identify them as immigrants,8 but we cannot assign them a country of birth.
For the source countries, or countries of birth, we choose the following classication:
EU countries, non-EU Europe (including Russia and Turkey), West Asia (from Lebanon
to Iran), East Asia and Oceania, Africa, Latin America, Canada9 and \unclassied"10. A
more detailed dierentiation is not possible, due to existing classications in the German
and French data sources. For the econometric analysis, people who migrate between our
four destination countries also have to be excluded,11 but the descriptive results reported
in the next section cover these migrants as well.
As a further step, we have to standardize a number of other variables we are using.
The only institution for which the standardization is not trivial is education. Here, we
classify educational attainments of our observations using the International Standard
8Alternative explanations for why Germans with German parents should have \migrated" to Germany
are highly unlikely. For instance, since World War II Germany had hardly any armed forces positioned
abroad. Also, all persons with German nationality who came to Germany before 1949, mostly as refugees
from former parts of the country, are automatically dened as natives.
9In the case of Germany, Canadians are excluded, as we cannot distinguish them from US Americans.
10By far the largest part of them being German \Aussiedler".
11The reason is that, with respect to migration between the four countries, we can only observe potential
outcomes of migration to three destination countries. Decisions to stay in the home country or to migrate
there, though vastly dierent, cannot be told apart.
5Classication of Education (ISCED) 1997. For the German data, we use the algorithm
proposed by Schr odter et al. (2006) and for the American data the mapping between years
of schooling and ISCED levels given in Institute for Education Sciences (2007). The French
data already contain education levels in the ISCED classication. For the British data,
our re-classication follows the LFS User Guide (2007) with two deviations.12 Also, we do
not use all ISCED levels, but form four categories: no secondary educational attainment
(ISCED 0-1), lower-secondary educational attainment (ISCED 2), upper-secondary and
post-secondary non-tertiary educational attainment (ISCED 3-4) and tertiary educational
attainment (ISCED 5-6). Dierentiations between ISCED 3 and 4 and between ISCED 5
and 6 are hardly comparable across countries.
In the last step, we merge the standardized variables from the four national data sets
to form one large data base, using the weights from the original data sources. As these
weights make the data sets representative for the dierent countries, our data base should
also be representative. Since the Enqu^ ete Emploi does not contain information on persons
who are younger than 15, our descriptive results only refer to people aged 15 and over.
For the econometric analysis, we further drop all individuals who are younger than 25, as
many of these people have not yet reached their nal educational level. Including these
observations could thus lead to biased estimates.
3 Some descriptive results
Before turning to the econometric analysis, we present some descriptive statistics from our
data. These statistics do not only serve as background information for our estimation re-
sults, they are also interesting in themselves. Applying a consistent denition of migrants,
12First, we classify people who state to have been in school, but have not acquired any formal degree
as ISCED 1, not ISCED 2. Second, we do not classify people who state to have \other qualications"
as ISCED 3, but assign them the median ISCED level of people with the same age and the same (last)
occupation. For this, we use the SOC (Standard Occupational Classication) 2000 unit-level classication
which distinguishes between 353 dierent occupations. An assignment of educational levels is necessary,
as most foreign degrees are recorded as \other qualication" in the British LFS.
6our data give a very precise picture of the migrant population in the four countries.13
Comparing the shares of immigrants in the population aged 15 and older in the four
countries already leads to a surprising result (cf. table 1). We nd the highest share of
immigrants in Germany, with 16.8%, followed by the US with 14.4%, France with 8.5%
and the UK with 8.2%. The large share of immigrants in Germany, a country that is
actually well-known for its restrictive immigration policy, has two reasons. The German
\guest-worker" agreements with Turkey, Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain and Portugal caused a
large immigration wave between 1955 and 1973, and has led to a continuous in-ow of
migrants due to family re-unication programs ever since. In addition, and probably even
more important, is the \(Sp at-)Aussiedler" legislation mentioned above. The other shares
are in line with common expectations: the US as an \immigration country" have a much
larger share of immigrants than France and the UK. Eects of the recent, more liberal
immigration policy in the UK, especially the opening of the labor market for people from
Eastern Europe in 2004, are not yet visible in the data from 2005.
Table 1 also gives an overview over the most important countries of origin of the
migrants to the four countries. In France, these are above all neighboring countries in
Europe and Northern Africa. In Germany, Southern and Eastern European countries are
the most important countries of origin; at the same time, one third of all German immi-
grants cannot be classied, most of them being \(Sp at-)Aussiedler" in all likelihood. In
contrast to Germany and France, the most important source countries of immigrants to
the UK are former colonies outside Europe, together with Ireland and Poland. For the
US, countries in Central and Caribbean America and large East Asian countries are the
most important ones. It is remarkable that almost one third of the American immigrant
population comes from Mexico. In none of the European countries, immigration is simi-
larly concentrated on one country of origin. However, the European countries also dier
with respect to the concentration: 38.8% of the immigrants to France, but only 26.8%
and 24.5% of the immigrants to Germany and the UK respectively are from the three
13For a larger set of descriptive results that are based on the same data base, see Geis et al. (2008).
7most important countries of origin.
There are not only dierences regarding the countries of origin of immigrants, but
also regarding their structure in terms of educational attainments. Table 2 shows how
immigrants aged 25 to 54 are distributed over the educational groups dened above.
For comparison, we add the corresponding distribution of natives. The share of \high-
skilled" immigrants (ISCED 5+6) is highest in the US, followed by the UK, Germany
and France. The picture is similar for \qualied" immigrants, i.e., for those with at least
an upper secondary degree (ISCED 3-6). Obviously, the Anglo-Saxon countries attract
people with higher qualications than the countries in Continental Europe. At the same
time, immigrant populations within a particular country are far from being homogeneous
in this respect. For instance, the share of high-skilled immigrants from Mexico to the
US is far below that of natives; this is also the case for immigrants from other Latin
American countries, but the dierence is much smaller; however, the share by far exceeds
that of natives for immigrants from non-Latin American countries. All in all, this leads
to a U-shaped pattern of educational attainments of immigrants to the US. In Europe,
there are similar dierences between various immigrant groups, e.g., between Turkish and
other immigrants to Germany, but they are much smaller than in the US.14
A further interesting aspect is the economic integration of immigrants. As a rough
measure, we include unemployment rates (following the ILO denition) dierentiated
by educational attainments in table 2. In all European countries, unemployment rates of
immigrants are much higher than those of natives, but in the UK they are still much lower
than in France and Germany. In the US, however, unemployment rates of immigrants fall
short of those of natives, except for the highest education level (ISCED 5+6). Note that
this cannot be explained by dierent selections into unemployment and non-participation,
since participation rates of immigrants are not smaller compared to those of natives in the
US than in Europe. These observations clearly indicate that all the European countries
we consider have more diculties in integrating immigrants into their labor markets than
14See, again, Geis et al. (2008) for more details.
8the US. They also show that economic integration diers across skill groups. When
analyzing the determinants of migration, it is thus less appropriate to rely on country-
wide averages. Specic information, i.e. information dierentiated with respect to skill
groups for example, is of value, which we are able to use in the following due to the
micro-structure of our data.
4 Determinants of migration
In the economic migration literature, wages and unemployment rates are generally consid-
ered the most important determinants of migration (see the seminal papers by Sjaastad
1962; Todaro 1969; Harris and Todaro 1970). As these two factors vary strongly across
dierent population groups, detailed data are needed for a meaningful econometric anal-
ysis.With our micro-data, we are able to include dierentiated data. For this, we use the
unemployment rates following the ILO denition and calculate specic unemployment
rates of immigrants dierentiated by education and gender.
However, obtaining consistent data on wages is very dicult in general and still far
from easy even with our micro-data, since the wage data provided in our data sets are
not comparable across countries. To generate wage information from our four national
data sources which are as consistent as possible, we proceed as follows: In a rst step, we
calculate wages per hour using information on wage earnings and working hours contained
in all datasets. As our German dataset actually contains income and not wage data, we
consider only persons stating to have no income other than wages for this.15 In a next step,
we calculate wages of immigrants for the various gender-education groups relative to the
respective average wages in each country. In the last step, we multiply these relative wages
of immigrants with data on GDP per capita (from OECD 2007a). We cannot directly
compare our intermediate results regarding wages per hour, since we have information on
net wages for the European countries, while we observe gross wages in the US. Note that
15Note, that after the further steps described in the following, we assign wage information also to those
Germans with other income sources, which enables us to again use the complete dataset.
9this means that the dispersion of our wage measure for the US is probably exaggerated
compared to that in the European countries. Still, we think our dierentiated measure
of wages is superior to (uniform) GDP per capita which is used in many other studies on
the determinants of migration (see, e.g., Pedersen et al. 2008; Mayda 2007; Docquier et
al. 2007).
Another very important determinant of migration are migrant networks (see Munshi
2003 for a comprehensive analysis of Mexican networks in the US). These networks fa-
cilitate migration as they transmit detailed information about the destination country
and provide a social network once new migrants have arrived. Furthermore, where such
networks exist, many people have the opportunity to use preferential family re-unication
programs to immigrate. In our econometric analysis, we use the share of persons from a
specic source country in the population of the destination country as a measure of the
strength of the migrant network. Due to data limitations, we can actually do so only for
immigrant groups representing at least 0.2% of the population in the destination country.
This need not be a problem, however, as smaller groups are probably lacking the critical
mass to deliver the benets of a network. As the eect of the size of the network on mi-
gration decisions may not be linear { in smaller networks, additional persons are probably
more important than in larger ones { we also include the square of this measure.
In addition, immigration policy and the openness of a country for immigrants may
also inuence the migration decision. However, immigration policy is dicult to measure
{ immigration laws are usually complex and rather case-specic { and there does not
exist a consistent indicator of immigration policy, or openness, for all our four destination
countries.16 Thus, we cannot observe this determinant directly. Yet, as one should assume
that in the long run a more open country attracts more immigrants, we use the total share
of foreign-born persons in a country as a rough measure for its openness to migrants.
Beside the factors discussed so far, there is a host of other potential determinants of
16For the European countries, the British Council and Migration Policy Group (2007) has proposed
such an indicator, called MIPEX. However, it does not contain any information regarding the US.
10migrants' location choices.17 For instance, unemployment benets should also have an
inuence on migration decisions, since expected income in the destination country is basi-
cally given by the employment rate times wages plus the unemployment rate times these
benets. However, quantifying unemployment benets is complicated as benet entitle-
ments often depend on the time a person has been (un-)employed. For our set-up, the
most convincing measure that is available are average replacement rates for the rst ve
years of unemployment as provided by the OECD (2004).18 The role of unemployment
benets may also depend on the unemployment rate in a given country. If unemploy-
ment is low, migrants expect to nd work, and benets have next to no inuence on the
decision for this country. However, if unemployment is high, migrants expect to become
unemployed with some probability, and benets really matter for their potential income.
To control for this eect, we interact the replacement rate with the unemployment rate.
Other factors which aect expected income in the destination country are income taxes
and social-security contributions. As we are unable to fully capture the dierent schemes
by which these levies redistribute income from highly productive to less productive in-
dividuals we use total tax wedges (including social-security contributions), dierentiated
for average high- and low-income workers without children and for average workers with
children, as indicated by the OECD (2006b) as a measure for the scal burdens that arise.
There are further labor-market institutions that may also have an impact on location
decisions of migrants. For people who have to build up a new existence abroad, job secu-
rity is probably an important criterion. A good measure for job security is the (overall)
employment protection legislation (EPL) indicator calculated by the OECD (2004). It
ranks the legal requirements for dismissals in various countries on a scale from 0 to 6,
higher values indicating stricter regulation. In many countries, trade unions are another
important labor-market institution. To capture their power, we use the share of em-
ployment contracts covered by collective wage agreements (OECD 2004). Employment
17Table 3 gives an overview of the institutional determinants we include in our analysis.
18Unfortunately, these data do not allow for a dierentiation by educational levels. Replacement rates
may be higher for low-skilled than for high-skilled individuals if part of the benets are lump-sum.
11protection and union power, though attractive for those covered or represented, may
also lead to insider-outsider problems. Therefore, we additionally interact them with the
unemployment rate.
When considering to migrate, people may not only look at their labor-market prospects
but also at institutions in other areas. One important factor may be the health-care system
in potential destination countries. We eectively use infant mortality (OECD 2007b) as a
measure for the quality of health-care systems. For young families (and persons who think
about having children), the education system in the destination country may also play a
role. We thus include PISA science scores (OECD 2006a) as a measure for the quality
of the education system. At the same time, people who do not (plan to) have children
may not prefer high-quality public education as this requires higher taxes. The education
system of a destination country can also aect the choice of potential immigrants for
other reasons. Countries with a high share of high-skilled individuals are potentially
more innovative than others and therefore likely to generate higher growth. We therefore
include the share of people with a tertiary degree (ISCED 5+6) from our micro-data as a
measure for the skill structure.
Last but not least, a generous old-age pension system could also have a positive impact
on the location choice; but since migrants rst have to pay a correspondingly higher
amount of contributions, the eect can also be negative.19 In any case, we use pension
replacement rates dierentiated by wage brackets (OECD 2007c) to control for this aspect.
There are certainly many more institutions that may also play a role for the decision to
migrate to a particular country. We believe, however, that the institutions described here
(see also table 3) are the most important ones.
19This is actually the prediction derived from simulations of the nancial eects of public pension
schemes for migrants in Werding and Munz (2005).
125 Estimation strategy
For the estimation, we use a combination of a Conditional and a Multinomial Logit
Model (CMNL).20 The basic idea of the model is that among a range J of options { in
our case, among destination countries, individuals choose the one that oers them the
highest utility, Vij; here, i denotes the individual and j the option. This utility, in turn,
depends on option-dependent explanatory variables, Xij, and on option-invariant ones,
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The observed variable yij indicates which option an individual has chosen. Thus, for
k 2 J , yik = 1 and yi:k = 0 if Vik = maxj(Vij). Furthermore, it is assumed that the
error terms, ij, are independent and log-Weibull-distributed; the density of this function
is e( ij e
 ij). It can be shown that the probability function has the following form (see
Amemiya 1981):










For the estimation, this CMNL has to be transformed into a pure Conditional Logit
Model. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005), we use the following probability function
for the estimation:
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yij(xij    xi) = 0 (4)
20Although this combination is well-known in the econometric literature, it has no particular name. It
is sometimes called Mixed or Multinomial Logit Model, but these labels also refer to other models.
13with  xi =
Pm
l=1 pilxij. The marginal eects of changes in the option-dependent explana-
tory variables can be calculated as follows (cf. Cameron and Trivedi 2005):
@pij
@xik
= pij(ijk   pik) (5)
The equation gives the eect of a change in the independent variable for option k on the






= xik(ijk   pik) (6)
It can be shown that the resulting estimates are consistent, asymptotically normal and
asymptotically ecient. A characteristic of the Conditional Logit Model which is often
criticized is the independence of irrelevant alternatives. In our case, this is actually an
advantage, as we can only observe a limited number of countries. Our results would be
of very limited relevance if the possibility to go to Spain had an eect on choices between
Germany and the US.
The low variation in our institutional variables { many of them are country-specic
{ clearly presents a challenge. On the one hand, considering all of them in a single
regression is not possible, as this would lead to multi-collinearity. On the other hand,
more detailed information is not available, and adding more destination countries to our
data set is all but easy. Therefore, we choose to expand the number of estimations using
dierent combinations of the various institutions captured by our data. The following
individual-specic variables are included in all regressions: level of education, gender, age
(and age squared), (squared) years since migration and region of the country of birth.
Furthermore, all regressions contain information on wages, unemployment rates and the
(squared) size of migrant networks, as these are variables which are conventionally found
to have a strong impact on migrants' location decisions.
In a rst step, the institutional variables are then included one by one in the re-
gressions. As there could also be interactions between the institutions, we repeat the
estimations with all possible pairs and triplets of institutions (while including four or
more institutional variables in a single estimation may lead to multi-collinearity). If the
14dispersion of estimated coecients for an explanatory variable is not too large, the esti-
mate should not be aected by an omitted-variables problem. We then infer the direction
and magnitude of the eects from the median coecients we obtain. Similar approaches
have been proposed in other areas of economics and social sciences (for instance, Sala-i-
Martin 1997 uses a similar approach to explain economic growth; Hegre and Salaris 2007
do the same to explain civil wars). We use the extreme-bound criterion proposed by
Leamer (1985) to test the signicance of our estimates.21
6 Estimation results
The results of regressions in which we control for wages, unemployment rates, networks
(squared) and one further institutional variable (for a complete list, see table 3) are shown
in table 4. The variables are all signicant at the 1% level. Due to space limitations, esti-
mates for individual-level characteristics are not reported; except for the country-of-birth
dummies for Canada and for those not classied (mainly German \Sp at-Aussiedler"),
they are also signicant at the 1% level. The pseudo-R2 of about 0.64 indicates that
our explanatory variables are indeed important determinants of migrants' choices of a
destination country. Most variables have positive eects, the exceptions being the un-
employment rate, infant mortality, the tax wedge, the pension replacement rate and the
share of high skilled. There are also negative eects of the squared network eect and the
interaction terms of employment protection, unemployment benets and union coverage
with the unemployment rate.
Table 5 displays the median results derived from the full set of our estimations, i.e.,
where we control for one, two or three institutional variables in addition to wages, unem-
ployment rates and networks (squared). Except for the share of high skilled, the median
21Lower (upper) extreme bounds are given by minimum (maximum) estimates minus (plus) two times
the corresponding standard deviation. We also tried to apply the criterion proposed by Sala-i-Martin
(1997). However, in our case { with low standard errors of the estimates, but relatively high variation
over specications { this criterion is inappropriate, as it attaches no weight to the variation of coecients
over specications.
15results of our estimates all have the same signs as those reported in table 4.22 This indi-
cates that the estimated eects are stable across specications. Furthermore, most of our
results are in line with expectations. For instance, for wages we nd the expected positive
eect and for unemployment rates the expected negative eect. Immigrant networks have
a positive eect, but their impact is decreasing as the squared network variable has a
negative sign. This indicates that networks really facilitate immigration to a country;
however, when the network is already large, an increase in its size has hardly an addi-
tional positive eect. We also nd that open countries, i.e., those with a high share of
foreign-born people, are indeed more attractive for immigrants than countries with a low
share.
Other results are less clear a priori, hence potentially more interesting. Employment
protection, union coverage and unemployment benets have positive eects, indicating
that migrants prefer destination countries where they are protected from labor-market
risks. It also implies that the immigrants in our data set did not expect to become
outsiders in the labor market of their destination country. Otherwise, these measures
should be detrimental for immigrants as they hamper access to the labor market. At the
same time, the negative coecients for the interaction terms of employment protection
and union coverage with the unemployment rate indicate that if unemployment becomes
large, insider-outsider eects may become an issue.
We also nd a negative eect of the income tax wedge on migration decisions, al-
though higher taxes are potentially connected with better public services. The negative
eect of pension replacement rates can be explained by the fact that more generous pen-
sion systems usually involve higher contributions and, hence, create a higher \implicit
tax" than less ambitious schemes. Also, they may be subject to higher political risks in
countries with low fertility rates. Good health-care systems and good education systems
involve higher taxes as well which have to be paid also by healthy or childless immigrants.
22Also, except for union coverage, median and average estimates reported in table 5 all have the same
signs.
16Nevertheless, the quality of both systems has a positive eect on migration decisions.23
The negative eect of the share of high-skilled people in the destination country is a
bit puzzling. However, a potential explanation is that quite a number of migrants are
high-skilled themselves and have to compete against these \incumbents". We will discuss
this in more detail below , based on additional estimations that are dierentiated by skill
levels of migrants. There, we also obtain more dierentiated results regarding the eects
of labor-market institutions.
To reduce the potential selection of our sample through re-migration, we repeat our
estimations for the sub-group of individuals who migrated after 1995, i.e., within a max-
imum period of 10 years. The results are shown in table 6.24 By and large, the estimates
conrm our earlier results, but three coecients change their sign. We now nd a pos-
itive eect of the pension replacement rate, while the estimates for union coverage and
unemployment benets become negative. The latter may indicate that insider-outsider
problems arising from labor-market institutions are indeed relevant for newly arriving
migrants.25
To assess the quantitative importance of our estimates, we calculate a matrix of elas-
ticities for the socio-economic and institutional variables that is presented in table 7.26
Among other things, we nd that a 1% increase in the unemployment rate in the US de-
creases the probability to migrate to the US by 0.13%, while it increases the one to go to
Germany by 0.07%, to the UK by 0.02% and to France by 0.04% (thus exactly absorbing
the change in Prob(US)). A 1% increase in the unemployment rate in France decreases
23Higher quality of the health-care system is reected in a decrease in infant mortality.
24In another series of alternative estimates, we also applied a dierent weighting scheme for individual
observations, hypothetically normalizing the population in each of our destination countries to 50 million.
The idea was to avoid any biases that might arise from huge dierences in terms of population size.
However, the results were basically unchanged.
25Alternatively, there could be both time eects and cohort eects aecting the results with respect to
more recent immigration.
26Note that these elasticities do not reect indirect eects of changes in institutions. For instance, an
increase in unemployment benets is often linked to a decrease in (net) wages. Our elasticities show how
large the eects of institutions are in ceteris-paribus terms and give us an idea of the importance of these
institutions for the choice of a destination country.
17the probability to go to France by 0.83% (the large dierence between the US and France
being due to the fact that a 1% increase equals a total change by 0.07 percentage points
in the US, but by 0.19 percentage points in France). Also, the ex-ante probability to go
to the US is higher than the probability to go to France. The elasticities with respect to
wages have the same magnitude as those for unemployment rates, but with opposite signs.
Most of the elasticities regarding the institutional variables are even larger than those for
wages and unemployment rates. Note, however, that this is partly due to the scaling and
the actual range of variation of the variables.27 In any case, they show that the role of
labor-market institutions and other institutional characteristics of potential destination
countries is not only statistically but also economically signicant for migrants' location
choices.
Determinants of location choices are very likely to dier for high-skilled and low-skilled
migrants. Therefore, we further exploit out micro-data and repeat our estimates running
separate regressions for low-skilled (ISCED 0-2) and qualied (ISCED 3-6) migrants.28
Note that, in contrast to existing studies based on macro data, we already control for
dierences between skill levels in the analysis of the full sample. However, the estimated
coecients only represent average eects, and skill-related dierences are therefore cap-
tured in option-invariant variables and in the error term.
Table 8 summarizes the estimates for low-skilled and qualied migrants. Note that the
estimates for qualied immigrants are in general more reliable than those for low-skilled
ones: High-skilled persons are relatively free in their choice of a destination country, while
low-skilled people face more restrictive immigration policies and thus a more limited choice
of destinations. For wages, networks and employment protection we nd positive eects
for both groups, as in the full data set; for unemployment and tax wedges we nd negative
eects. The other estimates dier between the two groups. The estimated eects for
27For instance, the employment protection indicator eectively ranges from 0.7 to 2.9, while the PISA
scores lie between 489 and 516 points (cf. table 3).
28In this case, we exclude interactions with the unemployment rate, as they could lead to multi-
collinearity in this smaller data set.
18union coverage and unemployment benets are positive for low-skilled immigrants and
negative for the qualied. This could be explained by the fact that low-skilled people
usually benet more from high unemployment benets and collectively negotiated wages
than high-skilled ones. In fact, unemployment benets are generally associated with costs
which have to be paid more than proportionally by people with higher skills. Pension
replacement rates now have a positive eect for high-skilled people, while for the low
skilled the eect is still negative. The observed change for the high skilled might be due
to the fact that the pension replacement rates as we use them, i.e. dierentiated by wage
brackets, indeed capture two characteristics of pension systems: their overall generosity
as well as their tax-benet link. There is evidence that both are positively connected
(see Koethenbuerger et al. 2008); hence, the high skilled might be better o in countries
with higher pension replacement rates which are less redistributive, whereas low-skilled
immigrants might prefer systems that are less generous, but possibly more redistributive.
PISA scores and the share of foreigners have the expected positive sign for high-skilled
immigrants and a negative sign for the low skilled while infant mortality has the expected
negative sign for the high skilled and a positive sign for low-skilled immigrants.29 For
these specic results, even public expenditure does not oer a plausible reason, as the high
skilled usually pay more taxes than the low skilled. Moreover, low-skilled immigrants tend
to have more children and often suer from more health problems than the high skilled.
We consider these results as underlining the lower reliability of the estimates for the low
skilled as just discussed. The share of high-skilled people shows the expected signs now.
For high-skilled immigrants who have to compete with high-skilled natives, it is negative;
for low-skilled immigrants who are probably complements, it is positive.
29In the case of low-skilled migrants, the negative sign for PISA scores and the positive eect of infant
mortality, which captures a low quality of the health system, are puzzling.
197 Conclusions
The decision to migrate to a particular country is a complex process and may be aected
by various factors. Economists conventionally expect wages and unemployment rates to
have an impact on this decision. In this paper, we show that the institutional setting
in potential destination countries also plays an important role. Eectively, our results
indicate that wages and unemployment rates alone do by far not suce to explain location
choices of (\non-refugee") migrants.
In addition to the conventional eects of wages and unemployment rates, which are
positive respectively negative, we nd a positive, but declining, eect of the size of im-
migrant networks and a positive eect of the \openness" of a country in general. For
employment protection, union coverage and unemployment benets, the eects turn out
to be positive as well. Thus, protection against labor-market risks is obviously important
for immigrants.30 At the same time, there are indications that insider-outsider problems
related to these institutions become an issue if unemployment becomes large. In addition,
a higher tax wedge has a negative eect, deterring potential migrants. We also nd that
PISA scores have a positive eect and infant mortality a negative eect on the migration
decision, indicating that migrants value good education and health systems. Our esti-
mate for pension benets is negative, arguably because of the higher implicit tax rate and
higher political risks associated with more generous pension schemes.
Our results regarding the eects of labor-market institutions become more dierenti-
ated if we restrict attention to migrants who arrived during the last 10 years only. Union
coverage and unemployment benets then have a negative impact, while employment pro-
tection still has a positive one. If we run separate estimations for migrants in dierent
skill groups, the same is true with respect to migration of qualied individuals. Again,
30An interesting issue that arises in this context is that of the risk aversion of migrants (see, e.g.,
Chiswick 1978; and Todaro 1980, for early contributions). Generally speaking migrants should be char-
acterized by a low degree of risk aversion as they take on the risk of migrating. But this is no contradiction
to our nding that they are seeking some protection. Also note that we neither compare their risk attitude
to that of the population in the migrants' source countries nor to that of the natives of their destination
countries.
20this may point to negative repercussions of labor-market institutions on the migrants'
labor-market prospects.
We are unable to consider all the characteristics of destination countries that are po-
tentially important for the migration decision. For instance, we are lacking any measures
for the access of migrants to housing.31 Also, some of the proxies we are using, e.g., for
education systems, health protection as well as immigration policies, have limitations re-
sulting from the lack of consistent data. Another shortcoming of our analysis arises from
the fact that, for some of the variables we include, there is actually little variation in the
data. For some of the institutions we investigate, it is dicult to reconstruct all varia-
tion that exists at the individual level, while others are simply xed at a national level,
i.e., they are the same for all migrants living in one country. Still, combining micro-data
from four major destination countries we provide new insights as to whether and how
institutions play a role for migration decisions.
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25Table 2: Educational attainments of immigrants (aged 25{54)
Immigrants France Germany UK USA
ISCED 0-1
Number 699,323 718,828 509,257 3,884,751
Share 28.56% 11.70% 21.13% 18.27%
Participation rate 67.98% 60.36% 49.95% 73.25%
Unemployment rate 19.15% 26.86% 9.25% 7.99%
Wage* $12.91 $13.51 $12.47 $11.39
ISCED 2
Number 512,363 1,596,041 305,096 2,659,406
Share 20.92% 25.97% 12.66% 12.51%
Participation rate 76.05% 75.08% 78.99% 74.26%
Unemployment rate 21.55% 20.65% 7.65% 7.80%
Wage* $13.22 $13.42 $15.98 $12.84
ISCED 3+4
Number 701,190 2,547,618 880,387 7,583,786
Share 28.63% 41.46% 36.53% 35.67%
Participation rate 81.39% 84.46% 84.08% 78.40%
Unemployment rate 17.19% 15.56% 5.65% 6.26%
Wage* $14.23 $14.71 $19.77 $16.38
ISCED 5+6
Number 535,926 1,282,602 715,139 7,132,580
Share 21.89% 20.87% 29.68% 33.55%
Participation rate 80.90% 81.55% 87.75% 81.23%
Unemployment rate 15.81% 12.69% 5.43% 4.24%
Wage* $19.56 $20.02 $26.16 $30.08
Natives France Germany UK USA
ISCED 0-1
Number 1,613,090 368,143 2,590,481 1,667,184
Share 7.13% 1.24% 11.96% 1.63%
Participation rate 74.75% 68.14% 61.94% 51.41%
Unemployment rate 13.18% 29.47% 6.98% 13.33%
Wage* $12.87 $9.61 $14.17 $14.24
ISCED 2
Number 4,478,207 3,003,786 3,905,006 7,655,447
Share 19.78% 10.14% 18.03% 7.47%
Participation rate 84.92% 79.40% 82.30% 67.58%
Unemployment rate 12.10% 18.42% 4.27% 14.63%
Wage* $14.44 $13.31 $15.99 $14.13
ISCED 3+4
Number 10,167,941 17,763,323 8,428,241 53,448,746
Share 44.92% 59.96% 38.91% 52.18%
Participation rate 90.00% 88.62% 88.44% 81.64%
Unemployment rate 6.90% 9.87% 2.78% 6.39%
Wage* $15.32 $15.30 $18.60 $18.75
ISCED 5+6
Number 6,375,285 8,490,608 6,736,941 39,661,288
Share 28.17% 28.66% 31.10% 38.72%
Participation rate 91.67% 90.61% 93.08% 87.84%
Unemployment rate 5.45% 3.92% 1.81% 3.01%
Wage* $20.86 $20.87 $25.87 $30.68
* Hourly wages are derived as described in section 4.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 7: Median elasticities (full sample)
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US -0.131 0.075 0.022 0.034 6.92%
unemployment Germany 0.551 -0.694 0.056 0.087 17.59%
rate in UK 0.207 0.069 -0.307 0.031 6.64%
France 0.575 0.199 0.057 -0.831 18.50%
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US 0.150 -0.089 -0.029 -0.032 $19.18
wage per hour in Germany -0.237 0.288 -0.023 -0.029 $15.34
UK -0.310 -0.098 0.445 -0.036 $20.21
France -0.239 -0.075 -0.023 0.337 $15.25
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US 0.015 -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 0.90%
Network in Germany -0.026 0.052 -0.005 -0.021 0.55%
UK -0.076 -0.011 0.093 -0.006 0.06%
France -0.028 -0.045 -0.012 0.085 0.11%
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US 1.676 -0.982 -0.294 -0.400 15.46%
share of foreign Germany -3.231 3.983 -0.319 -0.433 16.75%
born in UK -1.987 -0.654 2.908 -0.266 10.30%
France -2.251 -0.741 -0.222 3.214 11.67%
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US -1.261 0.737 0.223 0.301 6.8
infant mortality Germany 1.286 -1.587 0.128 0.173 3.9
UK 1.682 0.553 -2.460 0.226 5.1
France 1.187 0.390 0.118 -1.695 3.6
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US 0.786 -0.460 -0.138 -0.189 0.7
employment Germany -4.999 6.166 -0.494 -0.673 2.5
protection UK -2.199 -0.722 3.218 -0.296 1.1
indicator in France -5.799 -1.904 -0.573 8.275 2.9
31Table 7 (continued)
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US 0.178 -0.104 -0.031 -0.042 14%
union coverage in Germany -1.537 1.894 -0.151 -0.206 68%
UK -0.746 -0.245 1.091 -0.100 33%
France -2.102 -0.692 -0.207 3.000 93%
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US 0.434 -0.254 -0.077 -0.104 13.8%
unemployment Germany -1.634 2.016 -0.162 -0.220 29.2%
benets in UK -0.912 -0.300 1.334 -0.123 16.3%
France -2.204 -0.724 -0.219 3.148 39.4%
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US -0.364 0.211 0.063 0.091 22.17%
tax wedge in Germany 1.274 -1.582 0.129 0.179 45.73%
UK 0.875 0.291 -1.285 0.118 31.23%
France 1.314 0.435 0.131 -1.880 46.77%
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US -0.243 0.140 0.042 0.060 58.6%
pension benets in Germany 0.414 -0.511 0.041 0.055 57.3%
UK 0.328 0.108 -0.485 0.048 45.7%
France 0.461 0.152 0.046 -0.659 63.9%
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US 1.911 -1.117 -0.338 -0.457 489
PISA-score in Germany -3.587 4.425 -0.356 -0.483 516
UK -3.580 -1.176 5.237 -0.482 515
France -3.441 -1.130 -0.342 4.913 495
Change in Change in Change in Change in Average
Prob(US) Prob(GE) Prob(UK) Prob(FR) value
1% increase in US 0.213 -0.125 -0.037 -0.051 37.93%
share of high skilled Germany -0.276 0.340 -0.027 -0.037 27.63%
persons (ISCED 5+6) UK -0.306 -0.101 0.448 -0.041 30.70%
in France -0.276 -0.091 -0.027 0.394 27.68%
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